Introduction
Olson (1993, p. 567 ) characterizes anarchy in terms of "uncoordinated competitive theft by 'roving bandits'". The emergence of government out of anarchy involves a "stationary bandit" that monopolizes theft and achieves an encompassing interest in some domain. The stationary bandit to provides public goods, such as law and order, to increase the wealth base from which it extracts. As long as total wealth increases by more than the amount extracted, both the bandit and the people in its domain are made better off by this movement out of anarchy.
The collective action problems that must be solved by such "bandits", both roving and stationary, are lurking in the background of Olson's (1993) analysis. In this context a bandit cannot be interpreted to mean a single individual. Monopolization of theft over a domain large enough to be termed a "state" requires the organization and coordination of a large group of individuals. An Olsonian bandit, therefore, must be interpreted as an effective theft-oriented organization pursuing the shared interests of its group members. Organizations that solve collective action problems to further group interests are the focus Olson's (1971 Olson's ( [1965 ) classic,
The Logic of Collective Action. In this paper I provide provide an Olsonian (1971) analysis of Olsonian (1993) bandits. To illustrate some of the relevant problems in group definition and collective action, I will employ a case study of the fourth and fifth century Visigothic migrations and the subsequent establishment of the Visigothic Kingdom in Gaul and the Iberian Peninsula.
The sort of theft-oriented organization described by Olson (1993) must be effective both initially as a roving bandit and subsequently as a stationary bandit or state. Being an effective roving bandit will not necessarily imply being effective once stationary. The organization may have to transform itself. In particular, it may have to (1) redefine its group to both (2) recognize an encompassing interest in some domain and then (3) effectively pursue it by providing collective goods. The redefinition of the group may involve the inclusion of new members and the exclusion of some existing members. Furthermore, there may be changes in the types of collective goods that organization provides.
Scholars possess scant historical knowledge of actual roving bandits that became stationary. The processes by which erstwhile roving bandits redefined their groups and shared interests played out in largely prehistoric times. To empirically illustrate these processes we must rely on evidence of societies that straddle the prehistoric and the historic, either temporally or spatially in the sense they are observed by other, historic societies. Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen (2003) and Baker and Bulte (2010) are examples of such investigations that focus on Vikings from around 800 AD to 1100 AD. Baker and Bulte advance the conjecture that competitive agglomeration of Viking groups, as well as of the groups defending against their attacks, played an important role in state formation. Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen provide a "theoretical history" (p. 256) of how some Viking groups transitioned from roving to stationary bandits. For most of the period considered by these authors, the Vikings did not keep their own written records. Yet their raiding groups may have been playing out an institutional evolution towards becoming states.
Alternatively, in a previous paper (Young, 2015) I study much earlier European societies of Germanic barbarians. I document the institutional changes in Germanic governance institutions that occurred from the first century BC through the first century AD. One notable change was the transition from temporary military kings elected from the nobility to standing armed retinues led by entrepreneurial commanders. These armed retinues were essentially Olsonian roving bandits: "If not governments, they were governance organizations with selfenforcing constitutions; a meaningful step out of the state of nature for these barbarians" (Young, 2015, p. 24) . In that paper I allude to these retinues as precursors to the stationary barbarian kingdoms that succeeded the Western Roman Empire. While I elaborate in some detail on the collective action problems faced and solved by these retinues, my characterization of them as precursors to the successor kingdoms was just a lick and a promise. In this paper I follow up with a more thoroughgoing defense of that characterization.
The illustrative historical case study that I employ involves a later (fourth and fifth century) group of Germanic barbarians: the Visigoths. During most of the fourth century, armed retinues similar to those described in Young (2015) were characteristic of Visigothic society.
During times of emergency (e.g., war) these retinues would occasionally confederate under an over-commander (referred to as a judge). But these confederacies would disband once the emergency had passed. Visigothic society during most of the fourth century is best characterized as one of roving bandits.
Alternatively, one particularly enduring confederacy was settled in the province of Gallia Aquitania around 417 by the Roman general (later emperor) Constantius III. By that time, I
argue, many of this confederacy's rank and file warriors were becoming cognizant of a breakdown of shared interest with the Visigothic elite. Likewise, the Visigothic elites were beginning to recognize encompassing interest in their domain. In particular, the barbarians were settled under the Roman policy of hospitalitas. Under this policy the Visigothic elites were granted broad claims to productive land shares. Furthermore, the elites stood to gain from exploiting the bureaucratic human capital of the Gallo-Roman aristocracy. Providing law and order required administration and taxation of the domain, something with which the barbarians had little experience. Alternatively, the senatorial class was literate and constituted the Empire's bureaucracy and civil service. Throughout the rest of the fifth century a true Visigothic Kingdom was established, with a capital in Toulouse, which by 476 (the conventional dating of the Western Empire's "fall") came to control southern Gaul and most of the Iberian Peninsula.
I provide a brief overview of Visigothic history from the fourth through the fifth centuries AD in section 2. Then, in section 3, I review my earlier account of the first century Germanic retinues (Young, 2015) and argue that similar retinues characterized fourth century Visigothic society. I provide an analysis of how a confederacy of these retinues evolved into the stationary Visigothic Kingdom in section 4. Concluding discussion is found in section 5.
The Visigoths: A Brief History from Constantine to their Settlement in Aquitaine
The Goths were a collection of eastern Germanic tribes. Based largely on the sixth century historian Jordanes, scholars were once comfortable speaking of two distinct Gothic tribes: the Visigoths (or Tervingi) and the Ostrogoths (Greuthungi). It was believed that these groups were well-defined going back to at least the third century. However, most scholars now believe that Gothic tribal/political affiliations were more fluid, and that the distinct Visigothic identity did not emerge until after a large group of Goths, fleeing an invasion by the Huns in 376, crossed the Danube and were settled in Moesia by the emperor Valens. Indeed, the Visigothic identity may not have emerged until the confederacy of Alaric formed in 395 (e.g., Collins, 2004, pp. 17-26; Grierson, 1941, pp. 11-14; Heather, 1996, pp.130-151 was the most stunning defeat that Rome had ever suffered at the hands of northern barbarians.
The emperors Gratian (who succeeded in the West in 375 when Valentinian died) and
Theodosius (who was elevated to the purple in the East in 379) picked up where Valens had left off, but with more success. However, the Goths were formidable enough to bring Theodosius to the negotiating table. In 382 a treaty was signed, the conditions of which testify to Rome's inability to defeat the barbarian confederation outright. In a departure from precedent, the Goths were not only granted land to settle; they were also allowed to maintain their own laws and communal autonomy. In return, as federates the Goths probably agreed to provide military services, including recruits, to Rome (Heather, 1998, p. 137) . At this point we lose track of Fritigern and no new judge is named by the literary sources for the remainder of Theodosius'
rule. Its usefulness having passed, the confederacy apparently disbanded.
By some accounts, Theodosius exhibited marked diplomacy towards the Goths. He regularly extended invitations to Gothic leading men to dine with him (Enapius fr. 59). However, he also called upon his federates to campaign against two separate usurpers (Maximus, who had murdered Gratian, and then Eugenius; both in the West). A Gothic revolt followed the campaign against Maximus but amounted to little. However, in the campaign against Eugenius there were reportedly as many as 10,000 Gothic casualties. 
Retinues: Roving Barbarian Bandits
Gaius Cornelius Tacitus published the Germania towards the end of the first century (circa 98 AD). In it, Tacitus records details of the barbarian peoples and their societies from the vast area that roughly encompassed modern Germany, Denmark, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, half of Hungary, and a part of Austria. 8 Many believe that Tacitus' account is based largely on the Elder Pliny's lost work, Bella Germaniae, and that Tacitus never actually set foot in Germania (Gudeman, 1900 retinues provided protection services and also pursued profit-seeking raids. In regards to the latter, they very much resembled the roving bandits described by Olson (1993) .
In Caesar's earlier account the kings (reges) are nobility, and they are associated with the sacral. Alternatively, the commanders (duces) of Tacitus' account are violent formeteurs (Congleton, 2011) who organized warriors into armed retinues that functioned as profit-seeking organizations. That profit was through "war and plunder" (Tacitus, ch. 14, p. 113 Commanders had to compete for the best warriors, and if those warriors were not remunerated accordingly then they could turn to competing duces that would do so.
These retinues were organized as clubs with self-enforcing constitutions (Leeson, 2011) . 11 A commander (qua formeteur) organized a group of warriors and then (qua entrepreneur) identified profit opportunities and provided leadership in their pursuit. The warriors were residual claimants of the retinue's profits (in the form of a commander's largesse).
The profits, of course, depended on the warriors collectively following the commander's lead and not shirking during battle. The oath-bound warriors likely policed one another through the threat of physical violence on defectors. Furthermore, Tactitus remarks that to "throw away one's shield in battle is the supreme disgrace, and the man who has thus dishonoured himself is debarred from attendance at sacrifice or assembly" (Tacitus, ch. 6, . This suggests across Germanic society broadly there existed mechanisms that contributed to an individual retinue's constitution being self-enforcing. Shirking may have led to exclusion from religious and governance institutions.
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The available evidence suggests that armed retinues of the type described by Tacitus in the first century were still prevalent in Germanic societies generally, and Gothic societies in particular, during the fourth century. Roman historians took greater notice of the confederacies 11 Club theory is associated with the seminal work of Buchanan (1965) . Sandler and Tschirhart (1997) provide a review of the subsequent contributions. 12 Religious clubs often rely on the threat of stigmatization and requirements of sacrifice to identify and exclude potential defectors (e.g., Berman and Laitin (2008) and Iannaccone (1992) ).
that from time to time. But that is not surprising given the motivations of those historians. 13 Even in 376, when the Visigoths were gathering on the banks of the Danube to plead for admission to the Empire, Ammianus Marcellinus (Book 31, p. 416) notes: "Our people paid little attention to this at first, because news of wars in those parts generally reaches distant hearers only when they are already over or at least quiescent." Romans were generally unconcerned with the internal matters of barbarians and tended to take notice only when larger confederacies involved themselves in the affairs of the Empire.
Between confederacies, the literary sources become relatively quiet. But what they do offer is consistent with the existence and activity of numerous armed retinues. In particular, the sources report occasional, small-scale raids across the frontier into Roman provinces.
Furthermore, emperors appear to have dealt with these small-scale raids in ways that suggest that they did not interpret them as orchestrated by some centralized state. For example, Gothic raids into Thrace and Moesia did not typically provoke an overwhelming response from Rome.
Anonymous Valesianus (ch. 5, p. 523) refers simply to Constantine's "check of their attack".
And even during the period when Valentinian and Valens had granted federate status to some group of Goths, sporadic Gothic raids into Thrace and Moesia did not provoke a strong response.
As Thompson (2008 Thompson ( [1966 
337). The use of iudicem
implies an over-commander; "a chief with powers superior to those of other chiefs" (Thompson, 2008 (Thompson, [1966 , p. 45).
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The evidence suggests, then, that large confederations of Goths were not the norm.
Rather they were short-lived organizations that were motivated by specific episodes or war or other emergency. Smaller-scale armed retinues of the type described by Tacitus were the norm.
Towards a Stationary Visigothic Kingdom
Up through the fourth century a Visigothic retinue resembled what Olson (1971, pp. 36-43) referred to as an exclusive group, meaning that it provided an exclusive collective good(s) to its group members. An exclusive collective good is one that is rivalrously enjoyed by group members and also difficult to exclude individual members from enjoying. Because it is rivalrous the amount enjoyed per member is decreasing in the number of members. A critical problem in groups providing exclusive goods is the regulation of the consumption by individual members.
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A roving bandit provides an exclusive collective good to its members: plunder. A key conundrum facing the commander of a roving bandit is how to prevent some members from shirking and freeriding off of the efforts of others. The results of raiding are, for the most part, likely to be divided equally. The plunder is not purely nonexcludable within the group. (For example, a member who has been detected while obviously shirking can be denied his share.
Also, an elite amongst the group may command larger shares.) However, accurately observing individual relative efforts during a raid and then dividing up shares of plunder accordingly is likely to be prohibitively costly. A commander as formeteur must limit group membership to regulate the consumption per capita of a given amount of plunder; as entrepreneur he also has to manage the members so that all are pulling their weight.
Consider the Visigothic retinues of the fourth century. The provinces of Thrace and
Moesia had a combined population of only about 2.5 million. Diminishing returns to additional warriors would have set in at fairly small retinue sizes. Beyond the number of warriors necessary to "efficiently" plunder a village or other population center, additional warriors would have drawn down the plunder per capita more than they added to it. Heather (1998, p. 66) notes: "the rise of groups of specialist armed retainers was a social development of the greatest importance.
[...] In the bulk of so-called Free Germany [...] weapon burials became common from at least the 15 Olson uses the example of a cartel working to establish an above-competitive price for its members' output. Given demand for that particular output, the more firms in the cartel the less each member can sell; the lower each member's profits. Furthermore, if the cartel cannot restrict individual firms from over-consuming the abovecompetitive price (i.e., putting too much output on the market for sale) then the exclusive good cannot be provided effectively.
first century AD." These burials as well as literary sources suggest that retinues of 200 or so men were the norm (Heather, 1998, pp. 66-68) .
For an organization such as the Visigothic retinue to transition from roving to stationary bandit, at least two fundamental changes may have to occur. First, the scale of the organization must increase significantly. A group of 200 warriors cannot monopolize a domain large enough to be considered a state (especially given fourth and fifth century military technologies). Second, the organization has to provide inclusive collective goods such as law and order. A supply of inclusive collective goods automatically expands as the number of individuals in the domain (and hence the theft/tax base) increases. Inclusive goods are both nonrival and nonexcludablethey are what economists typically mean in reference to public goods.
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For Olson (1993) , a stationary bandit is a state (or at least a proto-state). However, thinking in terms of exclusive versus inclusive collective goods provision may provide a useful distinction between the two. A stationary bandit is a group that, like a roving bandit, provides an exclusive good to its members (plunder -now called taxes). However, it also provides inclusive goods (e.g., law and order) to out-group members. The incentive to provide inclusive goods exists because they are an input to the production of the exclusive collective good that group members enjoy. The inclusive goods increase the tax base from which the group extracts.
Alternatively, most would consider a state to be a group containing all a domain's people. The government of a state provides inclusive goods to the group members. A stationary bandit recognizes an encompassing interest in its domain because doing so furthers its special interest.
Alternatively, a state recognizes an encompassing interest because its domain encompasses all of its members.
Returning to the discussion of Gothic retinues, an increase in scale occurred periodically when a number of them confederated, most often to defend against or attack similarly large groups of Romans or other barbarian groups. These confederations were typically short-lived.
However, under the leadership of Alaric a Visigothic confederation formed in 395 that endured and was eventually settled in Gaul under the leadership of Athaulf in 418/419. This confederation proved more durable in part because the Visigoths benefited from federate status.
Furthermore, Alaric's sack of Rome gave the Visigoths not only a taste of plunder writ large, but also greater bargaining power for imperial subsidies. As Collins (2004, p. 22) observes:
[T]he so-called Visigothic confederacy in the Balkans after the treaty of 381 was a permanent military force in service of the emperor and was generally supplied by the imperial administration or was permitted to requisition the civilian population.
Collins characterizes the Visigothic confederacy as a mercenary army, providing services in exchange for subsidies. However, it can also be interpreted succeeding in an act of extortion: the Visigoths were being paid to not wreak havoc. The confederacy was still a roving bandit, but one that realized some economies of scale in going after bigger game.
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A fundamental transformation then occurred between Alaric's confederation and the nascent Visigothic kingdom of Theoderic. As Diaz (1999, p. 329) observes: "the figure of Alaric 17 Baker and Bulte (2010) describe the agglomeration of smaller Viking groups. Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen (2003, p. 261) provide further detail that is reminiscent of the Visigothic experience: "Raiding Vikings began to band together in large fleets and armies [and] sacked towns and markets [. ...] Occasionally the forces disbanded, while at other times they re-united in the so-called 'Great Army.'" Apparently Viking small-scale roving bandits also (at least initially) periodically took part in short-lived confederations. Interestingly, the theory that KurrildKlitgaard and Svendsen (2003) provide to account for the Viking experience does not explicitly deal with the process of confederation. The Visigothic Kingdom of the mid-fifth through eight centuries realized an encompassing interest in its domain. It taxed and provided defense of the realm; law and order within it. These inclusive goods created a surplus that was divided in a mutually beneficial way between the Visigoths and their subjects. Heather (1998, p. 183) observes that:
Fifth-century Aquitaine was extremely prosperous, in so far as prosperity can Furthermore: "The evidence for taxation paints, I think, a similar picture. Salvian, a priest of Marseilles, described at great length how, because of their tax burdens, rich and poor Romans alike had fled to the Goths" (Heather, 1998, p. 185) .
While the Gallo-Romans appear to have recognized the net benefits associated with their barbarian overlords, this is not to say that they necessarily embraced them or were embraced by them. The Gallo-Romans were generally out-group members:
The barbarians, after all, might prove not more objectionable than the -Hadrill, 1967, p. 29) .
The early Visigothic Kingdom was clearly a stationary bandit; it provided inclusive collective goods to the domain at large but only because it benefited the Visigoths.
While Gallo-Romans were generally out-group, the Visigothic elite (leading men;
optimates) was beginning to embrace at least part of their aristocracy. And this redefinition of the stationary bandit was not welcomed by all of the existing members. The Visigothic elite was in a position to negotiate their settlement with the Empire. This also put them in a position to administer Roman subsidies. Furthermore, settlement under the hospitalitas system gave the Visgothic elite an encompassing interest in the domain that was independent of the fate of the Empire.
Under the hospitalitas system, barbarians were legally treated as Roman soldiers being settled in a territory for the purpose of its defense. They were allotted a share of the productive land (often quoted as two thirds of the arable and one half of the pasture). Hospitalitas would have been administered through the Visigothic elite. The Visigothic elite gained "skin in the game"; claims on long-lived productive assets across the domain. 18 This served to create an encompassing interest in the domain for the Visigothic elite; to align their incentives with individuals of the domain at large (McGuire and Olson, 1996) . 19 They recognized an encompassing interest because doing so became consistent with their special interest.
18 Alternatively, Goffart (1980) has argued that the Empire actually provided barbarians with a share of the productive lands revenues (i.e., a tax share). (However, see Heather (1998, p. 182) who argues that the transfer of actual land was at least part of the Visigothic settlement in Aquitaine.) But in the case of taxation, again the Visigothic elite again would administer this and would gain an encompassing interest. 19 Olson (1993, p. 567 ) cited a quote from a monarchist in southern Italy (initially quoted in Banfield (1958) as being key motivation for studying the conditions under which both autocracies and democracies are conducive to economic growth: "Monarchy is the best kind of government because the King is then owner of the country." See Polishchuk and Syunyaev (2014) for evidence on the importance of elites' asset ownership for improving the provision of well-defined and enforced property rights. See Blaydes and Chaney (2013) for evidence from medieval
Maximizing the returns on these long-lived assets required the collection of taxes and the provision of inclusive collective goods such as law and order. These would, in addition to violent labor, require a bureaucracy more sophisticated than present in Visigothic political structures.
The Visigothic elite turned to the Gallo-Roman aristocracy. Members of the senatorial class had the human capital necessary to provide effective government administration and they factored into Visigothic courts prominently, especially after 450 (Mathisen, 2011; Heather, 1998, 191-194 Implied is the contribution of aristocratic Gallo-Romans to the budding Visigothic legal tradition; also, more generally, the alignment of incentives between the senators and the Visigothic elite. The former also began to dominate ecclesiastical positions. The Church provided an institutional check on the Visigothic government, again helping to align incentives (Mathisen, 2011) ).
Europe and the Muslim world supporting the complementary idea that such ownership should align incentives more effective when rulers' tenures are longer. Also, Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen (2003, p. 261 and p. 266) note that Vikings were often granted land by regions where they had or were likely to raid: "it gave the Vikings a long-term personal interest in defending the area and preventing others from attacking it."
While the Gallo-Roman aristocrats were embraced by the Visigothic elite, evidence suggests that significant parts of the Visigothic rank and file were sensing a divergence of their interests from those of their leading men. Thompson (1982 Thompson ( [1930 [A]t first he ardently desired to blot out the Roman name and to make all the Roman territory a Gothic empire in fact as well as in name, so that, to use the popular expressions, Gothia should take the place of Romania, and he, Athaulf, should become all that Caesar Augustus had once been.
Wallia was elected by the Visigoths at large to affect an anti-Roman change in policy stance, but ended up working closely with the Empire to negotiate a settlement and continued military service to the Romans (Orosius, Book 7, p. 396) . In general, since the second decade of the fifth century, the Visigoths at large were simply unable to find a leader that would be consistently anti-Roman (Thompson, 2008 (Thompson, [1966 . p. 49).
Concluding Discussion
Olson (1993) describes anarchy as characterized by roving bandits. When one of these bandits settles down within a particular domain, monopolizes theft, and begins providing public goods, this represents the emergence of a proto-government out of the state of nature. Roving bandits must be interpreted as theft-oriented organizations -a group of individuals organized to pursue a shared interest by extracting the wealth produced by others. What does it take for such and organization to settle down and resemble something more akin to a government?
In this paper I aim to tentatively address this question. In doing so I bring Olson's (1971 Olson's ( [1965 ) perspective to bear on the matter of Olson's (1993) I argue that the larger Gothic confederacies formed during times of emergency or war.
They typically disbanded afterwards, since diminishing returns to the number of warriors in a retinue set in quickly given the size of targets to raid. However, imperial subsidies and the experience of sacking Rome gave the Visigothic confederacy a taste for and expectation of rewards to larger scale activities. Furthermore, when the Empire settled the Visigoths in Gaul they granted them large shares of the productive land under the policy of hospitalitas. These grants were administered by the Visigothic elite and gave them an encompassing interest in the domain. To more effectively administer and tax their realm, the Visigothic elite drew upon the human capital of the Gallo-Roman aristocracy.
We learn a number of things from this analysis and case study. First, there is an important distinction between roving and stationary bandits in terms of the collective goods that they provide. Roving bandits provide an exclusive collective good (plunder) to its group members.
While stationary bandits also provide an exclusive good (perhaps now called taxes) to their members, they also provide inclusive collective goods (e.g., law and order) to members of the out-group. Doing so increases the stationary bandit's tax base. One way in which we can conceive of a further step (not considered by Olson) from stationary bandit to a state is the inclusion of the out-group (i.e., the population of the domain generally).
